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CORPORATE NATIONALITY AND THE DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES:
THE BARCELONA TRACTION CASE
NIGEL S. RODLEYt
I. INTRODUCTION
When Secretary of State William P. Rogers linked the Barcelona
Traction Case to the South West Africa Case2 and castigated those
decisions for having "eroded confidence in the Court,"' he may well
have had in mind several criticisms of the International Court of Justice.
He referred specifically only to the delays involved in the handing down
of the decisions-five years in the former case, seven in the latter-and
hoped "that the court will take steps to prevent such delays in the future
by deciding preliminary questions promptly without joining them to the
merits of the dispute."4 Although the court, in anticipation of such
criticism, attributed "the unusual length of the present proceedings" to
"the very long time-limits requested by the Parties,"5 it did not explain
the necessity of hearing argument on the merits of the case to decide the
particular "preliminary question" upon which its decision was eventually
based.6
The court inevitably had to cope with one of the more intractable
problems of modern international economic relations, the extent to which
'Research Fellow, New York University Center for International Studies; Visit-
ing Lecturer of Political Science, Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research.
1. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1970] I.C.J. 3. Selections may be
found at 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 653 (1970). The opinion of the court, with selected
extracts of some separate opinions and of the dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Rip-
hagen, is reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 227 (1970).
The case has been discussed in Higgins, Aspects of the Case Concerning the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 327 (1971) ;
Briggs, Barcelona Traction: The Jus Standi of Belgium, 65 AM. J. INT'L L 327
(1971). First-rate documentation is to be found in Note, Diplomatic Protection, 12
HARV. INT'L L.J. 91 (1971). Further treatment may be found in Comment, N.Y.U.J.
INT'L L. & POL. 391 (1970).
2. South West Africa, Second Phase, [1966] I.C.J. 6.
3. The Rule of Law and the Settlement of International Disputes, Address by
Secretary of State William P. Rogers to the 1970 Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 285, 288 (Proceedings 1970).
4. Id.
5. [1970] I.C.J. at 31-32.
6. As to the nature of the preliminary question, see text accompanying note 20
infra. Cf. Higgins, supra note 1, at 342-43; Briggs, supra note 1, at 328-30.
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there may or ought to be limitations on the manner in which a state deals
with investments made within its jurisdiction by foreigners. This is a
topic that has engaged the energies of politicians, economists and lawyers.
The political issues raised' go to the perceived affront to sovereignty
posed by foreign control of a state's economic destiny. The perceptions
stem from foreign investment generally and in certain industries, such as
natural resources extraction, specifically. Other affronts may be perceived
in suggestions that the organs of government may be held to a standard
of behavior imposed from outside or by demands that compensation be
paid for various kinds of domestic interference with the investment. The
economists argue whether foreign investment, particularly in the less
developed world, is helpful or detrimental to economic and social pro-
gress;8 they also concern themselves with the impact on the flow of
capital of various kinds of interference with such investments. Mean-
while, international lawyers,' buffeted by the storm of these contro-
versies, try to determine where, if it exists, the area of reconciliation
lies. Viewing the problem in terms of the right to diplomatic protection of
nationals abroad, they strive to define the limits of that right in relation
both to those whose interests are injured"0 and to the particular interests
capable of being protected diplomatically.
Clearly, the emergence of multinational enterprises, with their world-
wide financial, industrial, distributive and transportational interests, has
come to have a decisive impact on this debate. Their stake in its outcome
is sizable. The holding of the World Court in the Barcelona Traction
Case will have major repercussions for multinational enterprises, especial-
ly with regard to choosing the place of incorporation for holding com-
panies that will control operating subsidiaries and branches abroad. Such
7. An example of the political controversy is to be found in the famous United
States-Mexico discussions on expropriation, 3 G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
655-65 (1942). Couched partly in legal terms, it illustrates the difficulty of finding an
impartial, juridical vocabulary within which to confine the controversy.
8. Compare, e.g., P. BAIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROwTH (2d ed.
1968) with W. RosTow, THE EcoNoMIcs OF TArE-OF IxTo SusTAimD GROWTH
(1963).
9. The principal post-war monographs by lawyers are S. FRIEDmAN, ExPRomI-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1953); I. FOIGHE., NATIONA IZATiOx (1957); B.
WORTLEY, ExPROPIATION IN PUBLIC INrERNATioNAL LAw (1959); G. WHITE,
NATIoNALizAT ON OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1961) ; A. FAToulos, GovERNMENT
GUARANTErS To FOREIGN INVESTO S (1962) ; P. Lu.ucH, THE PROTECTON OF FoREIGN
INVESTMENT (1965). On the question of shareholders and nationality, see Jones, Claims
on Behalf of Nationals who are Shareholders in Foreign Companies, 26 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 225 (1949).
10. These are the only persons entitled to seek the espousal of their claims by
a particular state.
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decisions will no longer be based upon purely economic or fiscal con-
venience.
It was not until February, 1970 that the International Court of
Justice handed down its long-awaited opinion in the Barcelona Traction
Case. The court had first considered the matter in 1958, the case being
removed from the court's General List in 1961. The present application
was filed in June, 1962. Four preliminary objections were raised by
Spain, but the court rejected the first two of these in its judgment of
July 24, 1964.11 The latter two were joined to the merits and proceedings
continued until July 1, 1968. Twelve of the fifteen judges who concurred
in the court's decision in favor of Spain, on the ground of Spain's third
preliminary objection, did so for the reasons set out in the judgment. 2
Of these, five felt called upon to append separate opinions amplifying
their views of the controversy." The three other judges filed concurring
opinions, 4 citing their reasons, different from those in the official judg-
ment, for reaching the same decision. Judge ad hoc Riphagen, chosen
by Belgium, appended the sole dissenting opinion.
The student of international law cannot but be thankful that, despite
this tumultuous outpouring of judicial self-expression, 5 he is able to find
in the judgment common ground reached by a majority. The judgment
can be relied upon in seeking the ratio decidendi as well as for clues to
other matters stated obiter. Actually, some of the dicta may become of
greater import than the actual holding.
II. THE FACTS, THE LEGAL ISSUES AND THE DECISION
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., a Canadian 6 cor-
poration allegedly owned predominantly by Belgian corporate and in-
dividual interests, operated an electric power enterprise in Catalonia
(Spain) through several wholly, or almost wholly, owned Canadian and
Spanish subsidiaries. Spanish exchange control regulations prevented the
11. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., [1964] I.C.J. 6, noted in 3 CAN. Y.B.
INT"L L. 306 (1965).
12. President Bustamante y Rivero, Vice President Koretsky, Judges Ammoun,
Bengzon, Fitzmaurice, Forster, Lachs, Morelli, Onyeama, Padilla Nervo, Petren and
Judge ad hoc Armand-Ugon.
13. President Bustamante y Rivero, Judges Fitzmaurice, Morelli, Padilla Nervo
and Ammoun. Additionally, Judge Lachs appended a "declaration," while Judges Petren
and Onyeama filed a "joint declaration."
14. Judges Gros, Jessup and Tanaka. Further, although Judge Fitzmaurice
describes himself as agreeing with the judgment, "if with some reluctance" ([1970]
I.C.J. at 65), his reservations are by no means peripheral.
15. See the acerbic comment of Briggs, supra note 1, at 344, n. 78, and the critical
observation of Higgins, supra note 1, at 329, n. 5.
16. Ontario.
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subsidiaries from transferring funds to Barcelona Traction, which needed
the funds to service debt obligations. Certain Spanish creditors, owners
of bonds establishing their title to such obligations, successfully instituted
bankruptcy proceedings in the Spanish courts against Barcelona Traction.
As a result of these proceedings a new Spanish corporation gained control
of the enterprise, thus effectively displacing Barcelona Traction from any
remunerative participation in the electric power enterprise.
In bringing the matter before the World Court, Belgium, espousing
the claims of her shareholders, argued that Spain had:
1. Through arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by Spanish
authorities, committed an abuse of rights;
2. By its courts' purporting to adjudge bankrupt a Canadian
corporation, usurped its jurisdiction;
3. By a process of expropriation in violation of Spanish law,
caused a denial of justice lato sensu ;ff
4. By preventing Barcelona Traction and its subsidiaries from
being heard, caused a denial of justice stricto sensu.18
Spain initially met Belgium's claim for damages and reparation with
four preliminary objections, two of which, as noted earlier, were rejected
by the court in 1964. Spain also asserted both that Beligum had no
jus standi to bring a claim essentially involving protection of a Canadian
corporation and that Barcelona Traction had not exhausted local remedies
before commencing the action. It was on the basis of the former of these
-wo latter assertions that the court, which had joined these objections to
the merits, dismissed Belgium's complaint. Accordingly the court was
unable to consider the other issues directly, though it did shyly reveal
something of its approach to the protection of aliens' interests.
III. THE ROLE OF NATIONALITY IN THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF
ECONOMIC INTERESTS-THE RATIO DECIDENDI
In assessing Belgium's iss standi to bring the claim, the court was
essentially confronted by three questions:
1. Can the country whose nationals are shareholders of a third
country corporation exercise diplomatic protection in respect
of the interests of those nationals?
2. If not, is there an exception in a situation where the cor-
poration is no longer in existence?
17. Lato sensu means "in a broad sense."
18. Stricto sensu means "in a strict sense."
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3. If so, is such non-existence, for the purpose of diplomatic
protection of shareholders, evidenced by bankruptcy and the
appointment of a receiver?
The court gives a negative answer to the first question and refrains from
pronouncing on the second, on the ground of a negative answer to the
third. 9 Thus, according to the court, since the corporation was still in
esse and since Canada was the state of its nationality, it was Canada's
sole right to exercise diplomatic protection as it saw fit. The contention
concerning Belgium's right to protect the shareholders of the "practically
defunct" corporation is considered by the court to lack "all legal pre-
cision." The court states that "[o1nly in the event of the legal demise
of the company," which would deprive the shareholders of "the possibility
of a remedy available through the company," could "an independent
right of action for them and their government . . . arise."2 Drawing on
general principles of bankruptcy law as it relates to the status of juri-
dical persons and on the actual status of Barcelona Traction in Canadian
and Spanish law, the court finds that the company continued to exist.2 '
Under this analysis two interrelated questions arise:
1. What are the elements of diplomatic protection which lead
international law to choose between the company's national
state and that of the shareholder?
2. How is corporate nationality determined for the purposes
of diplomatic protection?
In dealing with the former question, the court begins by drawing a
distinction between the bilateral obligations involved in the field of
diplomatic protection and the multilateral "obligations erga omnes" com-
prised in such areas as aggression, genocide and human rights.2 This
distinction does not advance us very far and the importance of this
passage may well lie elsewhere."
19. The court considered as a fourth question whether the state of the share-
holders might exercise diplomatic protection when the state of incorporation lacks
capacity to bring a claim before the court. The court dismissed this objection on the
correct ground that a "link of compulsory jurisdiction" is irrelevant since "[interna-
tional judicial proceedings are but one of the means available to States in pursuit of
their right to exercise diplomatic protection." With respect to other aspects of
Canada's alleged lack of capacity, see the discussion of corporate nationality, text
accompanying note 49 et seq., infra.
20. [1970] I.C.J. at 42.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 33. Erga onines means "against all."
23. It would seem, for example, that the court is coyly apologizing for the South
West Africa decision. If Belgium's jus standi was rejected because of the bilateral
nature of diplomatic protection, then the court presumably erred in its reasoning in the
CORPORATE NATIONALITY
The question remains as to which particular state is owed an
obligation when foreign property is not accorded the requisite legal
protection.24 In pursuit of an answer, the court examines the nature of
the corporation in municipal law. It does this not in an attempt to derive
an international analogy for the domestic corporation, but rather to seek
"general principles of law" which might be applicable in determining the
allocation of rights as between companies and shareholders.2" This
examination leads to several none-too-controversial conclusions-that the
corporation is a separate juridical entity created to operate "in circum-
stances which exceed the normal capacity of individuals,"26 that there is a
separation of property rights denying the individual access to the cor-
porate assets as long as the company is in existence, that the company
serves the shareholders' best interests27 by acting in its own right, and
that by'protecting its own rights it will secure the interests of the share-
holders. 8 While the court does not deny that certain rights accrue to
shareholders in their capacity as 'such, it holds that since Belgium had
not based its claim on an infringement of the shareholders' direct rights,
the question was whether Belgium could act to protect the rights of the
corporation."
The apparent intention of drawing this dichotomy between the
rights and interests of shareholders is to suggest that states may only
extend diplomatic protection on behalf of their nationals when their
actual rights are infringed. In support of this conclusion, the court relies
upon two lines of argument. The first is that the burden was on Belgium
to show that it had a collateral right to that of Canada in the exercise
former case, since that involved a question of human rights. As Dr. Higgins puts it,
in the South West Africa Case the court "rejected the much more limited and modest
contention that two African states had a legal interest in the fulfillment of South
Africa's obligations, including a possible obligation of non-discrimination, in respect
of the mandate territory of South West Africa." Higgins, supra note 1, at 330.
24. Id.
25. The court does not actually use the expression "general principles of law" in
the applicable paragraph of its judgment. Para. 38, [1970] I.C.J. at 34-35. This seems
to be a perfectly reasonable use of a source of law that essentially permits the court to
"fill the gaps in international law" and to adopt a "law-developing role," even though
it falls short of invoking "notions of equity." Higgins, supra note 1, at 331. After
all, the entity for which protection is sought is a legal creation whose nationality
somehow has to be determined. Reliance on generally recognized principles of municipal
company law appears most appropriate to solve this particular moot international
legal problem.
26. [1970] I.CJ. at 35.
27. The company, by acting in its own right, serves the best interests of the
stockholders.
28. [1970] I.C.J. at 35-36.
29. Id. at 36.
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of diplomatic protection.3" But the Belgian Government had formulated
its position in negative terms, namely, that "there exists no rule of in-
ternational law which would deny the national State of the shareholders
the right of diplomatic protection for the purpose of seeking redress
pursuant to unlawful acts committed by another State against the com-
pany in which they hold shares."'" As the court correctly notes, this
formulation carried the implicit "admission that there is no rule of inter-
national law which expressly confers such a right on the shareholders' na-
tional State."" In keeping with the long tradition of reluctance in permit-
ting states to challenge the acts of other states without establishing a posi-
tive rule supporting such a challenge,"3 and in keeping with a general ten-
dency to recognize new customs more when they constitute extensions of
national sovereignty rather than restrictions thereof, 4 the court feels
that "[s]uch silence scarcely admits of interpretation in favour of the
shareholder.""3
The second line of argument flows from the proposition that claims
made on behalf of a state's national are the claims of the state itself. Here
the court expressly cites36 and reaffirms the dictum of its predecessor,
the Permanent Court of International Justice:
The question, therefore, whether the . . . dispute originates
in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the
case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this
standpoint. 7
But merely to state the principle begs the very question requiring elucida-
tion, whether or not the rights of Belgium are infringed when investments
of its nationals abroad are prejudicially affected.
The court thereupon refers to Belgium's argument that "since such
investments are part of a State's national economic resources, any pre-
judice to them directly involves the economic interest of the State."38
Its reply is as follows:
30. Id. at 38.
31. Id.
32. Id.
.33. Commencing with Case of the S. S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
34. Friedmann, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases-A Critique, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 229, 233 (1970).
35. [1970] I.C.J. at 39. Dr. Higgins understandably chafes at such judicial
timidity (Higgins, supra note 1, at 334), but its occurrence is hardly a source of
surprise.
36. [1970] I.C.J. at 47.
37. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2, [1924] P.C.IJ., ser.
A, No. 2, at 12.
38. [1970] I.CJ. at 47.
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Governments have been known to intervene in such circum-
stances not only when their interests were affected, but also when
they were threatened. However, it must be stressed that this
type of action is quite different from and outside the field of
diplomatic protection. When a State admits into its territory
foreign investments or foreign nationals . . . it is . . . bound
to extend to them the protection of the law. However, it does
not thereby become an insurer of that part of another State's
wealth which these investments represent. Every investment of
this kind carries certain risks. The real question is whether a
right has been violated, which right could only be the right of
the State to have its nationals enjoy a certain treatment guar-
anteed by general international law, in the absence of a treaty
applicable to the particular case. On the other hand it has been
stressed that it must be proved that the investment effectively
belongs to a particular economy. This is, as it is admitted, some-
times very difficult, in particular where complex undertakings
are involved. Thus the existing concrete test would be replaced
by one which might lead to a situation in which no diplomatic
protection could be exercised, with the consequence that an un-
lawful act by another State would remain without remedy.89
It is difficult to follow this chain of reasoning, but the court seems to be
saying essentially three things:
1. While in previous cases states not directly involved in an econ-
omic dispute have shown interest in its outcome,4" such interest has not
been related to the defense of specific legal rights. While this distinction
is valuable, it is not relevant to the situation presented to the court; i.e.,
where the economic interests of the state are directly concerned. Nor is it
persuasive to argue that because some types of diplomatic intervention
are not properly called "diplomatic protection," this is so in the instant
case.
2. The host state is not responsible for all risks that may befall
foreign investments. No issue can be taken with this statement, but it
does not appear how the question of the form of investment relates to
the question of risk in the first place.
3. The difficulty of establishing the geographical situs of the
economic enterprise makes it preferable to retain the established rule of
39. Id.
40. The United Kingdom and the United States are in that position in the present
case, for example.
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looking merely to the corporate nationality for diplomatic protection. To
the extent that the court is restating the criterion for determining cor-
porate nationality for the purposes of diplomatic protection, this is un-
exceptionable. But it is not very helpful to determine whether the
established rule denies to the state whose shareholders are its nationals
the right to exercise diplomatic protection on their behalf, simply on the
ground that it is the established rule.
Therefore, the first line of argument, regarding Belgium's failure to
bear its burden of proof, is the more persuasive.4 This seems especially
so when it is read together with the court's earlier remarks on the three
lines of precedents cited in support of Belgium's position. The first line
concerned the treatment of enemy and allied property during and after
the First and Second World Wars. 2 In rejecting as precedents for the
instant case the many occasions on which the corporate veil had been
pierced to determine the real national link of economic interests, the
court confines itself to stating that these occurrences constituted measures
undertaken ex necessitate as a means of economic warfare, while the
relevant provisions of peace treaties which continued the process were
aimed at securing reparations. These special principles would not normally
be applicable. 8
The second line of precedents was "the treatment of foreign property
consequent upon the nationalizations carried out in recent years by many
States."44 Here too the court, considering the arrangements "resulting
from structural changes in a State's economy" as stemming from a lex
specialis, feels that the specific agreements embodying the arrangements
were sui generis, providing "no guide in the present case."45 The im-
plications of this distinction between expropriation in cases of economic-
structural changes and other types of expropriation will be noted later.
The point to note presently is the unwillingness of the court to derive
general principles of legal behavior from such patterns of state practice
as may be found in these precedents.
This is particularly true of the third line of precedents which the
41. Professor Briggs, in his strong support of the judgment, also emphasizes
that Belgium had not shown the existence of a breach of obligation against her. Briggs,
supra note 1, at 334-37.
The court could have strengthened its argument by pointing out that it was the
rompany that had to exhaust local remedies before diplomatic protection could be
exercised. This requirement fortifies the central role of the company as opposed to
that of the shareholders.
42. [1970] I.C.J. at 40.
43. Id. at 41.
44. Id. at 40.
45. Id. at 41.
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court characterizes as "the general arbitral jurisprudence which has
accumulated in the last half-century. ' ' 4" The court takes a very restrictive
view of the importance of such precedents:
However, in most cases the decisions cited rested upon the
terms of instruments establishing the jurisdiction of the tribunal
or claims commission and determining what rights might enjoy
protection; they cannot therefore give rise to generalization
going beyond the special circumstances of each case. 7
While one may be inclined to favor the court's judicial caution in
recognizing general developments in the sensitive field of confrontation
of competing sovereign interests, some elaboration of why the court
chooses so to inhibit itself would have been welcome.48
Having traced the court's reasoning in concluding that Canada's
right to exercise diplomatic protection was superior to that of Belgium,
the question of how Canada was itself chosen to be the state of corporate
nationality may now be considered. The importance of the question is
illustrated by the controversy disclosed between the joint declaration of
judges Petren and Onyeama49 and that of Judge Lachs. 0 While Judge
Lachs feels called upon to reassert the right of protection of the Canadian
Government, stressing that "the existence of this right is an essential
premise of the Court's reasoning,"'" the former two judges deny the
relevance of the court's finding with respect to the nationality of the
corporation. They maintain both that the matter was not for the court
to determine (since both parties had recognized the corporation's Cana-
dian nationality and Canada's right to protect it) and that the question
merely concerned the existence of Belgium's collateral right of protec-
tion.52 Accordingly, they argue:
[T]he Court has not in this case to consider the question
whether the genuine connection principle is applicable to the
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. For example, it may well be asked how arbitral tribunals, empowered by
compromis to deal with shareholders' claims, have been able to determine the com-
pensable injury to the rights of shareholders when purporting to apply an inter-
national law that apparently recognizes none, except where the company is legally
defunct or, perhaps, where the state of incorporation is the tortfeasor state. Indeed, it
may be asked why a state would agree to a comnproinis that purports to protect non-
existent rights.
49. [1970] I.C.J. at 53.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 54.
52. Id. at 53.
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diplomatic protection of juristic persons, and, still less, to
speculate whether, if it is, valid objections could have been raised
against the exercise by Canada of diplomatic protection of
Barcelona Traction.' s
While, as will be seen, there is some ambiguity in the judgment con-
cerning this question, it would seem that the position stated in the joint
declaration should be considered to be a minority one.
The court deals with the matter of whether Canada, as a matter of
law, was the national state of Barcelona Traction in the course of its
treatment of Belgium's contention that Canada lacked capacity to bring
an action. 4 It states:
In allocating corporate entities to States for purposes of diplo-
matic protection, international law is based, but only to a
limited extent, on an analogy with the rules governing the
nationality of individuals. The traditional rule attributes the
right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the State
under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory
it has its registered office. These two criteria have been con-
firmed by long practice and by numerous international instru-
ments."
After referring to the practice of some states not to grant diplomatic
protection except "when it has its seat (si~ge social) or management
or centre of control in their territory, or when a majority or a sub-
stantial proportion of the shares has been owned by nationals of the
State concerned," the court then concludes that "no absolute test of the
'genuine connection' has found general acceptance."56 Here the court
tangentially refers to the Nottebohm5" case, declaring that the case
presents no analogy. However, it then proceeds to indicate factors that
indeed suggest "a close and permanent connection" of the company with
Canada. 8 This is followed by a documentation of the general recognition
of the company's Canadian nationality59 as well as of the specific recogni-
53. Id.
54. Id. at 42-43.
55. Id. at 43.
56. Id.
57. Notteboim, Second Phase, [1955] I.C.J. 4. See Note, Diplomatic Protection,
12 HARV. INT'L L.J. 91, 113-19 (1970).
58. [1970] I.C.J. at 43. Examples included the duration of fifty years of incorpora-
tion under Canadian law; the maintenance there of its registered office, accounts and
share registers; the holding of board meetings there for many years and listing in
the records of Canadian tax authorities.
59. Id. at 43-44.
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tion by Belgium of the company's "Canadian character""0 and of Canada's
actual exercise of diplomatic protection. 1 At this point, the court goes to
some pains to indicate that the reasons for Canada's termination of
proceedings are of no concern to it since this was a matter solely within
Canada's discretion, 2 and that Canada's right of protection in respect of
the Barcelona Traction Company "remains unaffected by the present
proceedings."63 It concludes this aspect of its reasoning curiously:
Though, having regard to the character of the case, the question
of Canada's right has not been before it, the Court has con-
sidered it necessary to clarify this issue. 4
The court here seems to be saying that its words are obiter dicta, as
Judges Petren and Onyeama maintain. Yet, even if these words are not
an "essential premise" of the court's overall reasoning, as Judge Lachs
suggests, they still form the basis for the rejection of Belgium's con-
tention that Canada lacked capacity to bring a claim. It may be that even
if Canada lacked such capacity, Belgium would have no better right. 5
After all, there was no state capable of protecting Nottebohm either. 6
But the court avoids this question in its treatment of Belgium's argument
by the reasoning outlined above. Accordingly, it is submitted, Canada's
right of protection has to be seen as being an integral part of the ratio
decidendi67 The effect of the court's words establishing the actual con-
60. Id. at 44.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 45-46.
63. Id. at 46.
64. Id.
65. See Briggs, supra note 1, at 343: "[Tihe jus standi of one state cannot
arise merely from the lack of jus standi in another." The court's distinction between
rights and interests also presents a problem. While a shareholder's interests may be
metamorphosed into rights upon the legal demise of the company, the legal basis for
that qualitative change is not expounded by the court. Thus, Judge Fitzmaurice's sug-
gestion that the law should contain an "enlightened rule" ([1970] I.G.J. at 77) that the
shareholder's government may intervene, where that of the company declines to do so,
seems inconsistent with the theory that the shareholder has no comparable rights capable
of protection.
66. Indeed poor Nottebohm was, for the purposes of diplomatic protection
against Guatemala, effectively denied a nationality, despite Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948)], which
reads:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.
If an individual could be so treated, it is not difficult to imagine the same fate befalling
a juridical entity.
67. Accordingly, Professor Briggs unfairly chastises Judges Fitzmaurice, Gros and
Jessup for their Nottebohm-induced reservations to the judgment:
The devotion of these judges to the link theory falls short of finding a link
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nection between Barcelona Traction and Canada would suggest that
while a corporation's nationality is that of the country of incorporation,
a closer connection may need to be demonstrated for the purposes of
diplomatic protection.
Whatever may be the difficulties with the court's reasoning, it
remains clear from the decision that the corporate or individual share-
holders of a corporation have no recourse to diplomatic protection separ-
ate from that of the corporation itself so long as the corporation legally
exists. The company itself must look to the state of incorporation for any
such protection. Although this position of general international law can,
of course, be varied by treaty stipulations or special agreement,68 in their
absence those responsible for establishing a corporation may well have
to take into consideration the willingness of the country of incorporation
to espouse the claims of companies whose shareholders are aliens. Indeed,
if Nottebohm has any application to this kind of situation, it may be well
to suggest the importance of incorporating in a state where there is a
genuine economic link with the shareholders. 9
IV. THE LAW RELATING TO THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE ECONOMIC
INTERESTS OF ALIENS-OBITER DICTA
While the court distinguishes the situation in Barcelona from those
in the chain of legal reasoning which would justify Belgian jus standi to
protect shareholders or Belgian economic interests against a state which
has violated no legal right of Belgium. Unable . . . to prove the existence
of Belgian jies standi, they have sought to presume it on the basis of irrelevant
emanations from Nottebohm.
Note 1 supra, at 343.
68. Thus, in the present state of the law, the protection of shareholders
requires that recourse be had to treaty stipulations or special agreements
directly concluded between the private investor and the State in which the
investment is placed. States ever more frequently provide for such protection, in
both bilateral and multilateral relations, either by means of special instru-
ments or within the framework of wider economic arrangements. Indeed,
whether in the form of multilateral or bilateral treaties between States, or
in that of agreements between States and companies, there has since the Second
World War been considerable development in the protection of foreign in-
vestments. The instruments in question contain provisions as to jurisdic-
tion and procedure in case of disputes concerning the treatment of investing
companies by the State in which they invest capital. Sometimes companies
are themselves vested with a direct right to defend their interests against
States through prescribed procedures. No such instrument is in force between
the Parties to the present case.
[1970] I.C.J. at 48.
69. It may also be observed that enterprises already in existence will be affected
by the decision. An obvious exmple is that of the recently nationalized assets of the
International Petroleum Company, a 99.9% American-owned subsidiary of Standard Oil
Company (New Jersey), incorporated in Toronto and operating, prior to the
nationalization, in Peru. The United States' firm espousal of the IPC's claims against
Peru is severely weakened by this decision. Peru may quite reasonably insist that only
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nationalizations involving "structural changes in a State's economy,""
it nevertheless gives some indication of its attitude in this area. Indeed,
this very distinction suggests that the court will be disinclined to treat all
uncompensated takings in the same manner. The judgment contains the
further hint that the legal consequences of expropriation may vary depen-
ding upon the degree of agreement on economic philosophy between
disputing states. As noted earlier, the court draws a distinction between
bilateral obligations and obligations erga omnes.7" At a later point in the
opinion it develops the thought:
[T]he law on the subject has been formed in a period
characterized by an intense conflict of systems and interests.
It is essentially bilateral relations which have been concerned,
relations in which the rights of both the State exercising dip-
lomatic protection and the State in respect of which protection
is sought have had to be safeguarded. Here as elsewhere, a
body of rules could only have developed with the consent of
those concerned.2
What the court seems to be saying is that the previously assumed con-
sensus regarding the illegality of expropriation without compensation has
so broken down that there may now be no international law rules of
general applicability, at least where the expropriations take place in the
setting of a structural reordering of the economy. The wording is general
enough, in fact, to include the kind of partial restructuring found in
recent Peruvian legislation, as well as the more thorough rearrangements
of the post-World War I socialist experience.
That the court may not be expected to view with favor the claims of
states whose nationals' property has been expropriated is also indicated
by three references to so-called non-business risks. At one point it refers
to the fact that the promoters of a company, in making their calculations,
take into consideration the possibility of "prejudice caused to the com-
pany by illegal treatment of some kind."78 In other words, the suggestion
seems to be that its projected or actual profitability may well reflect the
added risk. At a later point in its opinion, in alluding to the various
Canada has a right to speak for the company. See The Peruvian Nationalization of the
International Petroleum Company Holdings, a paper presented by the author to the
American Society of International Law, Regional Conference on Problems of Inter-
national Law in the Western Hemisphere, held at the Graduate Faculty, New School for
Social Research, April 2-3, 1971 and on file with the author.
70. [1970] IC.J. at 41.
71. See note 22 supra.
72. [19701 I.C.J. at 48 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 36.
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advantages accruing to foreign investment, the court finds it in no way
inequitable that these advantages "should be balanced by the risks arising
from the fact that the protection of the company and hence of its share-
holders is thus entrusted to a State other than the national State of the
shareholder." 4 Finally, as noted earlier,7  the opinion specifically denies
the obligation of the host state to be an insurer of the wealth represented
by foreign investments. It is difficult to avoid asking what legally com-
pensable damage could result to an enterprise whose accounts reflect the
possibility of expropriation or other detrimental action by a host govern-
ment.
A subsequent paragraph of the decision strengthens this interpreta-
tion.7' Although the language refers specifically to the protection of
shareholders, its applicability is more general, referring as it does to
bilateral and multilateral treaty relationships. Within its terms seem to
fall such agreements as the treaties of friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion concluded by the United States with several countries, the World
Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States77 and such "wider economic ar-
rangements" as the European Economic Community. Here the court
seems to be going far towards suggesting the possibility of an interna-
tional law of regional applicability. In any event, the court's recognition
of the need for treaties to regulate these problems of expropriation should
not be overlooked.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION FOR THE LAW RELATING TO
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
The so-called "multinational enterprise" or "multinational corpora-
tion" has come to play a sizable role in the sphere of international econom-
ic relations.78 On the one hand, it is considered to be a necessary adjunct
to governmental assistance in the economic development process. On the
other hand, it is seen as a powerful and elusive agent of Western economic
imperialism. It would seem that proponents of either position might agree
that these vast economic machines, operating all over the world, must be
effectively harnessed to the legal order of the peoples they affect, both
74. Id. at 51.
75. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
76. [1970] I.C.J. at 48, quoted in full, supra note 68.
77. Opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, [1966] 1 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
78. See generally Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for
Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REv. 739 (1970), including the wealth of references
contained therein.
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despite and because of the fact that the controlling beneficial ownership
is generally located in another country. International law is clearly not
up to such a task, and until it becomes so, it would seem wisest to suggest
that the best course for the court is to leave as much latitude as possible
to states affected by these institutions. In reply to the argument that such
an attitude might only create hostility by investors toward foreign invest-
ment, it can be maintained both that investors rely more on their percep-
tions of the investment climate in a country than on the protection of
international law and that many such investors have to continue to invest
abroad for a variety of reasons, including the need to secure a strong
market position and, in the case of natural resources extraction, to
exploit the resources where they can be found."9
The court makes two references to the multinational corporation.
Early in the opinion it states:
From its origins closely linked with international commerce,
diplomatic protection has sustained a particular impact from
the growth of international economic relations, and at the same
time from the profound transformations which have taken
place in the economic life of nations. These latter changes have
given birth to municipal institutions, which have transcended
frontiers and have begun to exercise considerable influence on
international relations. One of these phenomena which has a
particular bearing on the present case is the corporate entity.8"
Since, as noted earlier, the court takes a traditional view of corporations
in reaching its conclusions, the implication is that corporations must be
controlled by the municipal law of the countries through whose frontiers
they pass. The court's traditional respect for state sovereignty is unlikely
to mitigate this view.
The second reference provides the setting for the court's statement
regarding the "intense conflict of systems and interests"'" that had
characterized the period of legal evolution. The court observes:
Considering the important developments of the last half-century,
the growth of foreign investments and the expansion of the
international activities of corporations, in particular of holding
companies, which are often multinational, and considering the
79. Their apparent need to find areas of investment in order to dispose of their
"surplus capital" may well be another factor. See P. BARAN & P. SWEEZY, MONOPOLY
C iTAL. (1966).
80. [1970] I.C.J. at 34.
81. Id. at 48.
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way in which the economic interests of States have proliferated,
it may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law
has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules in the
matter have crystallized on the international plane.8"
This statement, apart from strengthening the suggestions made earlier,
carries the added inference that international law will be reluctant to
interfere with a state's attempt to exert jurisdiction over the maneuvers
of multinational corporations.
The judgment seems, then, to stand for the following principles:
1. Multinational enterprises may not shop for multiple bases of
diplomatic protection.
2. Multinational enterprises must be content with that of the country
where they have chosen to be registered, with some uncertainty as to
whether even that country will be permitted to espouse a claim without
some effective connection.
3. Shareholders' rights are no better than those of the corpora-
tion, except perhaps where the substance of the matter is one where
general principles of municipal law would also give special rights to
shareholders.
4. General international law is no longer adequate to challenge the
jurisdiction of host states as against those enterprises which themselves
constitute a challenge to sovereign jurisdiction.
5. This whole area of the law, if it can be settled, must be settled by
treaty.
It may be predicted that many developing countries will applaud this
decision.
82. Id.
